NoSmokingGun : A Closer Look at the GAO's first report on Sarasota, Florida's District 13. No smoking gun . . . Not if, but when and how often. Could Red be next? Detailed within the findings of the first GAO report is a series of troubling circumstances that reveal apparent blatant lapses in sound business checks and balances, and computer security basics on the part of Florida Secretary of State Kurt Browning, Sarasota Supervisor of Elections Kathy Dent as well as Elections Systems & Software (ES&S). What the GAO really said about Sarasota's lost 18K votes. What they didn't say about Florida's lost 89K votes. Sarasota District 13: If the tests can't find it, never mind it? The U.S. House of Representatives dismissed the contest of 2006 Sarasota's District 13 election with its missing 18,000 votes. As they should since GAO testing, "obtained increased assurance, but not absolute assurance that the ES&S iVotronic DREs used in Sarasota County's 2006 general election did not contribute to the large undervote in Florida-13 contest." Does this mean nothing's wrong with the iVotronic system? No. While the GAO's study was extensive and revealed a disturbing absence of good business practices on the part of Florida's Secretary of State and Sarasota's Supervisor of Elections, in the end GAO proved only that standard basic ballots work on working systems. A number of potential problem areas have as yet to be pursued comprehensively. GAO District 13: Blood on the floor, bullet in the head, where did that smoking gun go? As Florida settles on the GAO findings in Sarasota's District-13. Think duped again. For Florida and the rest of the country, the bigger picture here is not where did those pesky 18,000 votes go in one county? The bigger question is where did 89,000 votes go across the state? GAO D-13: Voters with Secret Decoder Rings Get Votes Counted. As voters, let's not confuse "we didn't find a bug"with "exoneration." For as thorough as the cumulative GAO studies were, there are yet too many technical paths not taken, too many questions not answered. Ironically, the much awaited final GAO report fizzles in the anemic testing of a TWO working touch screens in attempt to resolve the question of hardware failures causing the unrealistic undervote in Sarasota County. The inference of the report appears to be that if the voters poke at the touch screen enough times, eventually they hit the sweet spot. Ultimately, if the voters get lucky and succeed in poking the invisible dot, their votes are counted correctly. So there, the machines work. All you need is a secret decoder ring. |
| Truth, Lies, & Politics When is a coincidence too much of a coincidence to be one? |
| The Government Accountability Office released three investigative reports on Sarasota, Florida's District 13 faulty 2006 election. The findings detailed in these reports are the basis for the GAO articles above. ELECTIONS : Further Testing Could Provide Increased but Not Absolute Assurance That Voting Systems Did Not Cause Undervotes in Florida's 13th Congressional District. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0897t.pdf ELECTIONS : Status of GAO's Review of Voting Equipment Used in Florida's 13th Congressional District. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071167t.pdf ELECTIONS : Results of GAO's Testing of Voting Systems Used in Sarasota County in Florida's 13th Congressional District. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08425t.pdfc |
Fiction Stops Here |
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| The Government Accountability Office's Troubling Investigation Florida's 2006 Botched Election |
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