NoSmokingGun : A Closer Look at the GAO's first report on
Sarasota, Florida's District 13. No smoking gun . . . Not if, but
when and how often. Could Red be next? Detailed within the
findings of the first GAO report is a series of troubling circumstances
that reveal apparent blatant lapses in sound business checks and
balances, and computer security basics on the part of Florida Secretary
of State Kurt Browning, Sarasota Supervisor of Elections Kathy Dent
as well as Elections Systems & Software (ES&S).
What the GAO really said about Sarasota's lost 18K votes. What
they didn't say about Florida's lost 89K votes. Sarasota District
13: If the tests can't find it, never mind it? The U.S. House of
Representatives dismissed the contest of 2006 Sarasota's District 13
election with its missing 18,000 votes. As they should since GAO
testing, "obtained increased assurance, but not absolute assurance
that the ES&S iVotronic DREs used in Sarasota County's 2006
general election did not contribute to the large undervote in Florida-13
Does this mean nothing's wrong with the iVotronic system? No. While the
GAO's study was extensive and revealed a disturbing absence of good
business practices on the part of Florida's Secretary of State and
Sarasota's Supervisor of Elections, in the end GAO proved only that
standard basic ballots work on working systems. A number of potential
problem areas have as yet to be pursued comprehensively.
GAO District 13: Blood on the floor, bullet in the head, where
did that smoking gun go? As Florida settles on the GAO findings in
Sarasota's District-13. Think duped again. For Florida and the rest of
the country, the bigger picture here is not where did those pesky
18,000 votes go in one county? The bigger question is where did 89,000
votes go across the state?
GAO D-13: Voters with Secret Decoder Rings Get Votes Counted.
As voters, let's not confuse "we didn't find a bug"with "exoneration."
For as thorough as the cumulative GAO studies were, there are yet too
many technical paths not taken, too many questions not answered.
Ironically, the much awaited final GAO report fizzles in the anemic
testing of a TWO working touch screens in attempt to resolve the
question of hardware failures causing the unrealistic undervote in
The inference of the report appears to be that if the voters poke at the
touch screen enough times, eventually they hit the sweet spot.
Ultimately, if the voters get lucky and succeed in poking the invisible
dot, their votes are counted correctly. So there, the machines work.
All you need is a secret decoder ring.
|Truth, Lies, & Politics
When is a coincidence too much of a
coincidence to be one?
|The Government Accountability Office released three
investigative reports on Sarasota, Florida's District 13 faulty
2006 election. The findings detailed in these reports are the basis for
the GAO articles above.
ELECTIONS : Further Testing Could Provide Increased but Not
Absolute Assurance That Voting Systems Did Not Cause Undervotes
in Florida's 13th Congressional District.
ELECTIONS : Status of GAO's Review of Voting Equipment Used in
Florida's 13th Congressional District.
ELECTIONS : Results of GAO's Testing of Voting Systems Used in
Sarasota County in Florida's 13th Congressional District.
Fiction Stops Here
|The Government Accountability Office's
Florida's 2006 Botched Election